This paper explores a theory of generalization for learning problems on product distributions, complementing the existing learning theories in the sense that it does not rely on any complexity measures of the hypothesis classes. The main contributions are two general sample complexity bounds: (1)Õ`n k ǫ 2˘s amples are sufficient and necessary for learning an ǫ-optimal hypothesis in any problem on an n-dimensional product distribution, whose marginals have finite supports of sizes at most k; (2)Õ`n ǫ 2˘s amples are sufficient and necessary for any problem on n-dimensional product distributions if it satisfies a notion of strong monotonicity from the algorithmic game theory literature. As applications of these theories, we match the optimal sample complexity for single-parameter revenue maximization (Guo et al., STOC 2019), improve the state-of-theart for multi-parameter revenue maximization (Gonczarowski and Weinberg, FOCS 2018) and prophet inequality (Correa et al., EC 2019), and provide the first and tight sample complexity bound for Pandora's problem.
Introduction
The learning process is a process of choosing an appropriate function from a given set of functions.
-Vapnik [34] Generalization is widely recognized as one of the fundamental pillars of learning theory. A general learning problem asks whether we can select a function, often referred to as a hypothesis, from a hypothesis class to maximize or minimize the expectation w.r.t. an underlying distribution over the data domain, based on samples from the distribution. While it may be easy to select a hypothesis the maximizes or minimizes the average over the samples, how can we ensure that it generalizes and gets a similar performance on the underlying distribution? More quantitatively, we may ask about its sample complexity: how many samples are sufficient and necessary for choosing a hypothesis that is optimal on the true distribution up to an ǫ error? A widely studied example is the classification problem in supervised learning. In this problem, each data point is a feature-label pair px, yq P XˆY , where X is the feature domain, e.g., R n , and Y is the label domain, e.g., t0, 1u. Each hypothesis corresponds to a classifier, i.e., a feature-tolabel mapping f : X Þ Ñ Y ; its value on a data point px, yq is L`f pxq, y˘for some loss function L, e.g.,ˇˇf pxq´yˇˇ. The goal is to learn a classifier from samples to minimize the expected loss on the underlying distribution.
Meanwhile, the general learning problem also captures a wide range of optimization problems in the Bayesian model. The problem of learning revenue-maximizing auctions from data is a recent example which has received a lot of attention in algorithmic game theory and more generally in theoretical computer science. In this example, each data point comprises the valuations of the bidders; each hypothesis corresponds to an auction and its value is defined to be the revenue of the auction on the given valuations. We aim to learn an auction from sample valuations to maximize the expected revenue on the underlying value distributions.
Generalization from Complexity Measures of the Hypothesis Class
Most sample complexity bounds in learning theory rely on detailed structures of the hypothesis class H, and they hold for arbitrary distributions over the data domain. In particular, they build on various complexity measures of the hypothesis class, including the covering number [1] , Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [33] , Natarajan dimesnion [25] , pseudo-dimension [27] , fat-shattering dimension [5] , Rademacher complexity [4, 21] , local Rademacher complexity [6] , etc. Informally, each complexity measure provides a parameter d which represents the "degrees-of-freedom" of the hypothesis class H, and the corresponding sample complexity upper bound has the formÕ`d ǫ 2˘.
For example, the VC dimension characterizes the sample complexity of binary classification problems, and the Natarajan dimesnion captures that of multiclass classification problems (see, e.g., Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [30] ), if the underlying distribution could be arbitrary.
Further, the example of learning revenue-optimal auctions from data, in particular, the special case of selling a single item to n bidders, has been investigated using the covering number (e.g., Devanur et al. [14] , Gonczarowski and Nisan [16] ), pseudo-dimension (e.g., Morgenstern and Roughgarden [23] ), and Rademacher complexity (e.g., Syrgkanis [31] ). The "degrees-of-freedom" bounds in these works are allÕ`n ǫ˘a nd thus, lead to the sameÕ`n ǫ 3˘s ample complexity upper bound. 1 The bound once again holds for arbitrary distributions of the valuations, even correlated ones, although the problem of revenue-optimal auction design often considers product value distributions.
Our Contributions: a Theory of Generalization on Product Distributions
While the above theories suggest that simpler hypotheses generalize better, it has been increasingly important to consider complex ones. On the one hand, deep neural networks generalize surprisingly well on classification problems on real-world data despite their complexity (e.g., Zhang et al. [36] ). On the other hand, the revenue-optimal auction for selling even two heterogeneous items could have an infinite menu complexity (e.g., Daskalakis et al. [13] ). To this end, this paper asks:
Is there a complementary theory of generalization building on the simplicity of data instead of the hypothesis class?
In particular, it is standard to assume that the data is drawn from a product distribution in optimization problems in the Bayesian model, including the aforementioned revenue-maximization problem, and prophet inequality and Pandora's problem. Can we get sample complexity bounds from the independence of data dimensions, and only minimum knowledge about the hypotheses? Implicit Attempts in Previous Works. We first review several recent sample complexity bounds for specific optimization problems that implicitly explore the power of independent data dimensions. Cole and Roughgarden [10] and Roughgarden and Schrijvers [28] use independence in the single-parameter revenue maximization problems to analyze coordinate-wise the convergence of the empirical distribution to the true distribution. Correa et al. [12] employ a similar approach on prophet inequality. Their analyses of convergence, however, are problem dependent.
Cai and Daskalakis [8] propose a hybrid argument, which use the independence of data dimensions in multi-item auctions to derive sample complexity bounds from complexity measures of the hypothesis class w.r.t. each coordinate of the data domain. Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] exploit independence in multi-parameter revenue maximization to construct an improved covering number that holds specifically on product distributions. These results can be viewed as mixed approaches that benefit from independence, yet still rely on complexity measures of the hypothesis class.
Guo et al. [18] use independent data dimensions and a notion of monotonicity in single-parameter revenue maximization problems in the matroid setting to derive optimal sample complexity bounds. It is the closest to this paper. Part of our results can be viewed as generalizing theirs to all problems with the same notion of monotonicity.
Our Results. The contributions of the paper are two general sample complexity bounds from the independence of data dimensions, unrelated to any complexity measures of the hypothesis class. Both results use the same algorithm which we call the product empirical reward maximizer/risk minimize (PERM). It selects the best hypothesis w.r.t. a product empirical distribution such that each coordinate is a uniform distribution over the corresponding coordinate of the samples. This is different from the usual notion of empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over sample vectors, which is not a product distribution in general. The first result considers finite data domains.
Informal Theorem. Suppose the data has n independent dimensions, each of which takes k possible values. Then,Õ`n k ǫ 2˘s amples are sufficient and necessary for learning any hypothesis class. The proof of the upper bound is simple in hindsight. We bound the total variation distance between the product empirical distribution and the true distribution, which follows by standard connections between the total variation distance and the Hellinger distance, and simple calculations.
However, it gives surprisingly strong sample complexity upper bounds on the aforementioned optimization problems. In single-parameter revenue maximization, e.g., single-item auctions, the 
Pandora's problemÕ`n 3 ǫ 3˘Õ`n ǫ 2˘- Table 1 : Summary of results, in comparisons with the state-of-the-art. The results in bold are the best upper bounds in different settings. We use single-item auctions, and n-item auctions with a unit-demand bidder as the running examples of single-and multi-parameter revenue maximization. The bounds may vary in other settings; see Sec. 3 and 4. value can be discretized to multiples of ǫ [14] ; replacing k " 1 ǫ gives anÕ`n ǫ 3˘u pper bound. In other words, without any knowledge of auction theory, other than the fact that the value domain could be discretized, the above theorem matches the bounds derived from various complexity measures discussed in Section 1.1, which rely on detailed understandings of single-parameter auctions. In multi-parameter revenue maximization, e.g., with one unit-demand bidder and n items, the value domain can be discretized to multiples of ǫ 2 [2] ; hence, letting k " 1 ǫ 2 gives anÕ`n ǫ 4˘u pper bound, improving the state-of-the-art, i.e.,Õ`n 3 ǫ 4˘, by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] . 2 Further, we show that the type domain in prophet inequality can be discretized to multiples of ǫ, leading to anÕ`n ǫ 3ȗ pper bound. In prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards in particular, it implies thatÕ`n˘samples are sufficient to learn a 0.745-competitive algorithm w.r.t. the expected max reward, improving the recent result by Correa et al. [12] in the dependence on n. 3 Finally, we show that the type domain of Pandora's problem can also be discretized to multiples of ǫ, giving the first polynomial sample complexity bound for the problem.
Our second result revisits the notion of strong monotonicity, a key ingredient of the optimal sample complexity bounds for single-parameter revenue maximization by Guo et al. [18] . Strong monotonicity means that the expected value of the optimal hypothesis w.r.t. a distributionD does not decrease when it is applied to another distribution D that stochastically dominatesD. We generalize the analysis by Guo et al. [18] to any strongly monotone problem.
Informal Theorem. Suppose the data has n independent dimensions. Then,Õ`n ǫ 2˘s amples are sufficient and necessary for learning an arbitrary strongly monotone hypothesis class.
Further, we show that prophet inequality and Pandora's problem are both strongly monotone. Using this theorem, we get anÕ`n ǫ 2˘u pper bound for single-parameter revenue maximization, prophet inequality, and Pandora's problem. The linear dependence on the data dimension n is tight for all three problems. We remark that while the bound for single-parameter revenue maximization is the same as that by Guo et al. [18] , ours directly uses the PERM, which corresponds to the empirical Myerson auction, while that by Guo et al. [18] needs an appropriate regularization to the product empirical distributions and uses the corresponding regularized empirical Myerson auction.
Preliminaries

Model
A general learning problem (e.g., Chapter 1.4 of Vapnik [32] ) is defined by a hypothesis class denoted as H. We will abuse notation and refer to the problem defined by a hypothesis class H as problem H. Each hypothesis h P H is a mapping from T " T 1ˆT2ˆ¨¨¨ˆTn to r0, 1s, where T i Ď R is the domain of the i-th coordinate of the data type. We will refer to n as the data dimension of the problem, to make a distinction with various learning dimensions in the literature which measure the complexity of the hypothesis class. For a concrete running example, readers may think of T 1 " T 2 "¨¨¨" T n " r0, 1s. For any data type t P T, and any hypothesis h P H, hptq is the reward obtained by hypothesis h on a data point of type t.
Given a distribution D over T, we seek to pick a hypothesis h to maximize the expected reward:
Further, let Opt H`D˘d enote the optimal expected reward. We will omit the subscript H for brevity when the hypothesis class is clear from the context.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that D " D 1ˆD2ˆ¨¨¨ˆDn is a product distribution, as it is a standard assumption in all examples considered in the paper. See Section 2.2 for details.
A learning algorithm for a problem H takes N i.i.d. samples from the underlying distribution D as input and returns a hypothesis h P H. Let E i denote the uniform distribution over the i-th coordinate of the samples. We call E " E 1ˆE2ˆ¨¨¨ˆEn the product empirical distribution, and its optimal hypothesis h E the product empirical reward maximizer (PERM).
For any 0 ď ǫ ď 1, a hypothesis h is an ǫ-additive approximation if:
The sample complexity of a problem H is the minimum number of samples N for which there is a learning algorithm so that, for any distribution D, it takes N i.i.d. samples and returns an ǫ-additive approximation with probability at least 1´δ. The sample complexity bounds in this paper depend on the data dimension n, the approximation parameter ǫ, and the confidence parameter δ. In our first set of results, they further depend on the sizes of the data type domain T i 's. Importantly, they are independent of any complexity measure of the hypothesis class H.
Examples
Next, we define several example problems for which the theory developed in this paper improves or matches the state-of-the-art sample complexity bounds. We define each problem only with the minimum detail necessary for verifying that it is a special case of the above model. In particular, we intentionally do not characterize the optimal hypothesis to stress the main feature of our theory: it requires almost no knowledge of the hypothesis class; instead, it only needs that (1) D is a product distribution, and (2) some generic structural property, e.g., the data type domain can be discretized, or the problem satisfies strong monotonicity, which will be discussed in more details in Section 4.
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. For simplicity of exposition, we use single-item auctions with n bidders as the running example. Each bidder i has a type t i P r0, 1s that represents its value for the item, and is drawn independently from D i . An auction A maps any type profile t to an allocation x P r0, 1s n , }x} 1 ď 1, and a payment vector p P r0, 1s n . For any bidder i, x i is the probability that the bidder gets the item, and p i is its payment. Its utility equals x i t i´pi .
A bidder's type is private information known only to itself; therefore, the auctioneer must ask the bidders to report the values. Hence, the literature focuses on dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) auctions, which ensure that for any bidder, reporting the value truthfully always maximizes its utility. The goal is to pick a DSIC auction to maximize the expected revenue. Readers are referred to Myerson [24] for a characterization of the revenue optimal auction.
To place it in our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis h A for every DSIC auction A, such that h A ptq equals the revenue of auction A on a type profile t.
Readers who are familiar with auction theory may verify that the techniques in Section 3 apply to arbitrary single-parameter problems, and those in Section 4 apply to the matroid setting. 4
Multi-parameter Revenue Maximization. For simplicity of exposition, we use single-bidder auctions with n items as the running example. Section 3 will discuss the extension to multi-bidder multi-item auctions. The bidder has a type t P r0, 1s n such that t i is its value for item i, and is drawn independently from D i . There are various settings with different definitions of the bidder's value for subsets of items. The most-studied ones are the unit-demand bidder, whose value for a subset of items is the maximum value for a single item in the subset, and the additive bidder, whose value is the sum of item values it gets. An auction A maps any type t to a subset of items to be allocated to the bidder and its payment. The bidder's utility is equal to its value for the allocated subset minus the payment. The goal is to pick a DSIC auction to maximize the expected revenue. Readers are referred to Cai et al. [9] for an LP-based characterization of the optimal auction.
Similar to the single-parameter setting, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis h A for every DSIC auction A, such that h A ptq equals the revenue of auction A on type t. Prophet Inequality. Consider n rewards which arrive one at a time; each reward t i P r0, 1s is drawn independently from D i . On observing each reward, the algorithm must immediately decide whether to take it or not; it can take at most one reward. The goal is to maximize the expected reward. Readers are referred to Samuel-Cahn [29] for an algorithm that gets at least a half of the expected max reward, and Correa et al. [11] for an improved algorithm in the case of i.i.d. rewards that gets a 0.745 fraction of the expected max reward. Some readers may know it as the optimal stopping problem, while it is often known as prophet inequality in theoretical computer science.
To put it in our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis h A for every algorithm A, such that h A ptq equals what the algorithm gets when the reward sequence is t.
Pandora's Problem. Consider n boxes; each box i has a reward t i P r0, 1s drawn from D i and a fixed cost c i P r0, 1s for opening it. In each round, the algorithm decides if to take the best observed reward, or to open a new box. The goal is to maximize the reward it gets minus the total cost.
To interpret it in the our framework, define the hypothesis class H by having a hypothesis h A for every algorithm A. If we let h A ptq equals what the algorithm gets minus the cost when the reward sequence is t, its range would be r´n, 1s instead of r0, 1s. In the main text, we use a simple normalization, which let h A be the above value plus n and scaled by 1 n`1 . Appendix C.4 presents a more specialized method that gives the tight sample complexity bound.
Metrics for Probability Distributions
Consider two distributions P, Q over a sample domain T . For concreteness, think of T as a cube in the Euclidean space, e.g., r0, 1s or r0, 1s n .
Total Variation Distance. The total variation distance is a half of the L 1 distance:
The following useful fact about total variation distance follows by its definition. Recall that we are interested in multi-dimensional product distributions. It is hard to directly measure the total variation distance among such distributions. The standard method is to instead consider either the Kullback-Leibler divergence or the Hellinger distance; they are both additive in that we can account for the distance in each coordinate separately, and both can be related to the total variation distance. This paper uses the latter because it has better properties.
Hellinger Distance. The Hellinger distance between P and Q, denoted as H`P, Q˘, is given by:
dP´adQ˘2 .
More formally, for any measure λ over T so that both P and Q are absolutely continuous w.r.t. λ, let dP dλ be dQ dλ are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives. We have:
For example, if P and Q are continuous over r0, 1s with density functions p and q, or if P and Q are distributions over a discrete set T with probability mass functions p and q, we have:
The next two lemmas relate the Hellinger distance with the total variation distance, and formalize its additivity. Readers are referred to Gibbs and Su [15] for details of these properties and a comprehensive discussion on different metrics for probability distributions.
Lemma 2. Suppose P and Q are distributions over a sample domain T . Then, we have:
Lemma 3. Suppose P and Q are product distributions over T " T 1ˆT2ˆ¨¨¨ˆTn . Then:
Concentration Bound
We will use the standard concentration bound by Bernstein [7] , as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m be i.i.d. random variables such that ErX i s " 0, ErX 2 i s " σ 2 , and |X i | ď M for some constant M ą 0. Then, for any positive ∆, we have:
3 Problems with Finite (Discretized) Domain
General Sample Complexity Bounds
This section offers a theory of generalization for arbitrary hypotheses with finite domain.
Theorem 1. For any distribution D on T such that |T i | ď k for all 1 ď i ď n, suppose for some sufficiently large constant C ą 0, the number of samples is at least:
hen, with probability at least 1´δ, for any h : T Ñ r0, 1s, we have:ˇh pDq´hpEqˇˇď ǫ .
In particular, the PERM is an ǫ-additive approximation.
The proof is simple in hindsight. The key is bounding the convergence of the product empirical distribution to the true distribution in term of the Hellinger distance, as in the next lemma.
Lemma 5. With probability at least 1´δ:
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 1 assuming the correctness of the lemma, whose proof is deferred to the end of the section.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, with probability at least 1´δ:
Further by Lemma 2, we have:
Then, the theorem follows by Lemma 1.
We complement Theorem 1 with a matching lower bound up to a logarithmic factor. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 2. There is a problem H on a finite domain T with |T i | " k for all 1 ď i ď n, such that no algorithm gives an expected ǫ-additive approximation if the number of samples is less than: c¨n k ǫ 2 , for a sufficiently small constant c ą 0.
Applications
Although some problems are defined on continuous domains, most can be discretized, including all examples defined in Section 2.2. Observe that by rounding each sample to the closest discretized value, we effectively sample from the discretized distribution. Next we discuss the applications of Theorem 1 on the examples; the discretization arguments are either from previous works, or deferred to the appendix because they do not provide much insight. While some results will be subsumed by those in the next section, they are already comparable with the state-of-the-art in meaningful ways. We restress that our bounds are obtained knowing effectively nothing about the problems other than that the domains can be discretized, while previous works generally rely on detailed problem structures. We believe the same approach can be applied to other problems not covered in this paper.
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. Devanur et al. [14] show that we may w.l.o.g. round values down to multiples of ǫ in single-parameter revenue maximization if the target is an Opǫq-additive approximation. Hence, with k " 1 ǫ , Theorem 1 matches the previous results by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [23] , Devanur et al. [14] , and Syrgkanis [31] discussed in Section 1.1, i.e., the best bounds before the recent work of Guo et al. [18] . In fact, our bound is better in the logarithmic factors.
Theorem 3. In a single-item auction with n bidders whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n ǫ 3 logp n ǫδ q˘.
Multi-parameter Revenue Maximization. We consider the case for selling n-items to a unitdemand (resp., additive) bidder. It is known that rounding the item values down to multiples of ǫ 2 (resp., ǫ 2 {n) for a unit-demand (resp. additive) bidder is w.l.o.g. due to a reduction from approximate DSIC auctions to DSIC auctions, which states any ǫ 2 -DSIC mechanism can be transformed into a DSIC mechanism with at most ǫ loss in revenue (see, e.g., Balcan et al. [2] , attributed to Nisan). Therefore, Theorem 1 gives the following bounds that improve the best known results by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] .
Theorem 4. In a multi-item auction with n items and a unit-demand bidder whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n ǫ 4 logp n ǫδ q˘.
Theorem 5. In a multi-item auction with n items and an additive bidder whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n 2 ǫ 4 logp n ǫδ q˘. 5
Multiple Bidders. For n-bidder m-item auctions, Theorem 1 gives anÕ`m nk ǫ 2˘b ound if the buyers' value domains are finite with size k, improving those by Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] . For continuous value domains, however, there is no existing transformation from approximate DSIC to DSIC auctions in this more general setting; as a result, the aforementioned discretization no longer works. Either we settle with approximate DSIC auctions, or need to know more about the relation between approximate and exact DSIC auctions, which is a fundamental question on its own in auction theory. Readers are referred to Gonczarowski and Weinberg [17] on this topic. 5 In the additive case, the optimal revenue is bounded by r0, ns. The stated bound is an ǫ-approximation w.r.t. the normalized revenue divided by a factor 1 n . The bound would beÕ`n Prophet Inequality. We show that the rewards in prophet inequality can be discretized w.l.o.g. to multiples of ǫ. Hence, letting k " 1 ǫ , we get a sample complexity bound that improves the recent work of Correa et al. [12] in the dependence on n, with bounded rewards in r0, 1s and additive approximation. The discretization argument and an extension to the original setting of Correa et al. [12] with unbounded rewards and multiplicative approximation is deferred to Appendix B. Theorem 6. In the prophet inequality setting with n items whose rewards are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n ǫ 3 logp n ǫδ q˘.
Pandora's Problem. Recall that the main text uses a simple normalization by a factor 1 n`1 to ensure that the hypotheses in Pandora's problem has range r0, 1s. Hence, to get an ǫ-approximation w.r.t. Pandora's problem, we need a ǫ n`1 -approximately optimal hypothesis. Further, we show that the rewards can be w.l.o.g. discretized to multiples of ǫ. Putting together, we get the first polynomial sample complexity for Pandora's problem. The discretization argument and a more specialized method that gives the optimal sample complexity are deferred to Appendix C.
Theorem 7. In the Pandora's problem with n boxes whose rewards and costs are bounded in r0, 1s, the sample complexity is at most O`n 3 ǫ 3 logp n ǫδ q˘.
Convergence of Product Empirical Distribution: Proof of Lemma 5
By Lemma 3, we have:
The claim is equivalent to 1´H 2 pD, Eq ě 1´O`n k N logp nk δ q˘. Hence, it suffices to show that with probability at least 1´δ, for any 1 ď i ď n, 1´H 2 pD i , E i q ě 1´O`k N logp nk δ q˘, or equivalently:
By definition, we have
Further recall that |T i | ď k. Hence, it suffices to show that with probability at least 1´δ:
It remains to bound the convergence of f E i ptq to f D i ptq. Concretely, f E i ptq can be viewed as the average of N i.i.d. Bernoulli samples with mean f D i ptq and variance f D i ptq`1´f D i ptq˘. By Bernstein's inequality (Lemma 4), we have:
N˘s o that the RHS equals δ nk . With probability at least 1´δ nk :
By union bound, with probability at least 1´δ, the above holds for any 1 ď i ď n and any t P T i . Next, we finish the proof by showing Eqn. (2) when the above inequality holds:
Strongly Monotone Problems
This section considers the sample complexity of a subset of problems which satisfy a structural property called strong monotonicity, without any restrictions on the supports of the data domain.
Definition 1 (Strong Monotonicity). A problem H is strongly monotone if for any D, anyD that is stochastically dominated by D, and the optimal hypothesis hD ofD:
The name is inherited from the context of single-parameter revenue maximization, where each hypothesis h is a DSIC auction, v " D is the value profile, and hpDq is the expected revenue of the auction over the random realization of a value profile drawn from D. Then, the above inequality states that running the optimal auction w.r.t.D, a.k.a., Myerson's auction, on a distribution D that stochastically dominatesD, gets at least the optimal revenue w.r.t. the dominated distributioñ D. This is precisely the notion of strong revenue monotonicity introduced by Devanur et al. [14] . The naming is to make a distinction with the existing weaker notion of revenue monotonicity, which only requires that optimal revenue w.r.t. D to be weakly larger than that w.r.t.D. We restate below the weaker notion in the more general context in this paper.
Definition 2.
A problem H is weakly monotone if for any D, and anyD that is stochastically dominated by D:
Opt`D˘ě Opt`D˘.
Finally, we remark that there is an even stronger notion of monotonicity which we call hypothesiswise monotonicity.
Definition 3.
A problem H is hypothesis-wise monotone if for any D P R n , anyD P R n that is stochastically dominated by D, and any hypothesis h P H:
Clearly, hypothesis-wise monotonicity implies strong monotonicity, which in turns implies weak monotonicity. Weak monotonicity is insufficient for deriving the improved sample complexity bound with the techniques in this section. Hypothesis-wise monotonicity is too restrictive on the other hand; in fact, it fails to hold on any example considered in this paper.
The rest of the section argues that (1) strong monotonicity leads to an improved sample complexity bound, and (2) strong monotonicity holds in all but one examples considered in this paper, improving or matching the state-of-the-art sample complexity bounds.
Sample Complexity Bounds for Strongly Monotone Problems
The main result for strongly monotone problems is the following improved sample complexity upper bound. In particular, the bound is independent of the support size of the distributions and, in fact, applies to continuous distributions.
Theorem 8. For any strongly monotone problem H, suppose the number of samples is at least:
where C ą 0 is a sufficiently large constant independent of the problem H. Then, the PERM is an ǫ-additive approximation with probability at least 1´δ.
Remark: If the distributions are i.i.d., i.e., D i " D˚for any i P rns, it suffices to have the above number of sample values from D˚(rather than vectors from D) and construct an i.i.d. empirical distribution E such that each coordinate is a uniform distribution over the samples.
The above upper bound is identical to that in the special case of single-parameter revenue maximization by Guo et al. [18] ; the proof is also similar. The contributions of this paper are two-folds. First, we generalize it to arbitrary strongly monotone problems so that it can be further applied to a broader scope of problems, including the prophet inequalities and the Pandora's problem considered in this paper. Second, we show that the empirical maximizer itself achieves the optimal sample complexity bound when the reward function is bounded in r0, 1s; in contrast, Guo et al. [18] need a regularized version of the empirical distributions called the dominated empirical distributions, and uses the corresponding regularized maximizer.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 8, we remark that the above upper bound is tight up to a poly-logarithmic factor, due to an existing lower bound in the special case of single-parameter revenue maximization.
There is a strongly monotone problem H so that if the number of samples is less than:
where c ą 0 is a sufficiently small constant, no algorithm gets an expected ǫ-additive approximation.
Proof. Let H be the set of DSIC single-item auctions with n bidders. Restrict the bidders' valuations to be bounded in r0, 1s so that the value/revenue of any hypothesis/auction h P H on any value profile is bounded in r0, 1s. By Devanur et al. [14] , the single-item revenue maximization problem is strongly monotone. Further by Guo et al. [18] , the sample complexity of r0, 1s-bounded valuations and ǫ-additive approximation is at least Ωp n ǫ 2 q.
Proof of Theorem 8
By the Bernstein inequality and union bound, we can relate the CDFs of underlying distribution D and the empirical distribution E as follows.
Lemma 6 (e.g., Lemma 5 of Guo et al. [18] ). With probability at least 1´δ, we have that for any i P rns, and any t i P r0, 1s:ˇF
The rest of the subsection shows the stated additive approximation factor under the assumption that the inequality in Lemma 6 holds.
We introduce two auxiliary distributionD andĎ, where the former serves as an upper bound of E and the latter as a lower bound. Concretely, for any i P rns, define the CDF ofD i as follows:
The case of x i " 1 is defined separately because its CDF must be 1 for any distribution with support bounded in r0, 1s. The other cases are defined to be the smallest possible value of F E i`x iȃ ccording to Lemma 6 and the trivial lower bound of F E i`x i˘ě 0.
Similarly, for any i P rns, define the CDF ofĎ i as follows:
Then, the empirical distribution is sandwiched between the auxiliary distributions by definition.
Lemma 7. Assuming the inequality in Lemma 6, we have:
Therefore, we can lower bound the performance of the empirical maximizer, i.e., h E , on the underlying distribution D through a sequence of inequalities below:
(definition of Opt`D˘)
Therefore, it remains to show that with the number of samples stated in the theorem:
By Lemma 2, it suffices to upper bound the Hellinger distances, as in the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. For any distribution D and the correspondingD defined in Eqn.
(3), we have:
Lemma 9. For any distribution D and the correspondingĎ defined in Eqn. (4), we have:
The proofs of the above lemmas, which we include at the end of the subsection for completeness, are analogous to the proof of a similar lemma w.r.t. Kullback-Leibler divergence by Guo et al. [18] . The main difference is that the lemma by Guo et al. [18] requires additional conditions that lower bound the probability masses of the two endpoints of the support, while ours do not.
As corollaries of the lemma, with a number of samples stated in the lemma, we have:
Putting together with Lemma 2 proves Eqn. (5) , which finishes the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. By symmetry, it suffices to prove one of them. Below we prove Lemma 8.
For simplicity of notations in this proof, let Γ " lnp2N nδ´1q N be the coefficient that appears in the definition ofD, i.e., Eqn. (3). Further define:
gpyq " y´a2Γ¨yp1´yq´Γ .
Then, Eqn. (3) can be written as:
Further, the inequality in the lemma can be written as:
or equivalently:
Hence, it suffices to show that for any i P rns:
By definition, the squared Hellinger distance is:
We shall partition r0, 1s into three subsets based on how the CDF ofD i is defined in Eqn. (6): (a) the values whose FD i ptq " 0, (b) x " 1 whose FD i ptq " 1, and (c) the rest of the values whose 0 ă FD i ptq ă 1. Then, we account for their contributions to Eqn. (7) separately.
Part (a). Consider the values whose CDF is 0 w.r.t.D i . To formally define this subset of values, recall that gpyq " y´a2Γ¨yp1´yq´Γ. Let F ℓ P r0, 1s be the unique solution for:
The value of gpF ℓ q is strictly less than 0 when F ℓ " Γ, and is strictly greater than 0 when F ℓ " 4Γ. Hence, we have:
Let ℓ be the minimum value whose CDF is at least F ℓ , i.e.:
Then, for values in r0, ℓq, we have FD i ptq " 0 and therefore:
Part (b). For simplicity of notations, let f p1q " f D i p1q andf p1q " fD i p1q be the probability that x " 1 in D i andD i respectively. We have:
As corollaries, we have:f p1q ě max f p1q, Γ ( , and:`f p1q´f p1q˘2 " Γ¨`b2f p1q`1´f p1q˘`?Γ˘2 ď Γ¨`a2f p1q`?Γ˘2
ď Γ¨max f p1q, Γ ( .
Using the above two inequalities, the contribution from x " 1 is at most:
Part (c). It remains to bound the contribution from values t P rℓ, 1q. By Eqn. (6) and the definition of ℓ, the CDF w.r.t.D i of any value in this range is defined by a continuous mapping:
Therefore, the CDFs w.r.t. D i andD i have the same set of discontinuities in this range, i.e., the same set of point masses. We will first bound the contribution of values in rℓ, 1q under the assumption that both D i andD i are continuous in this range. Then, we will demonstrate how to generalize the result to arbitrary distributions by handling the common point masses appropriately.
Under the assumption of continuity, the contribution to the Hellinger distance by this part is:
By the definition of g, we have:
2y`1´y˘.
Therefore, it suffices to upper bound the following integral:
We will bound it in rF ℓ , 1´Γq and r1´Γ, 1s separately. The former is at most:
(Eqn. (8)) .
For the latter, it is upper bounded by:
Combining the upper bounds of the integrals over the two intervals, the contribution from part (c) under the assumption of continuity is at most O`Γ log 1
Γ˘.
Finally, consider any point mass t˚in the two distributions D i andD i . Letȳ " F D i pt˚q and y " lim tÑt˚´FD i ptq. Then, the probability mass of t˚w.r.t. D i isȳ´y, and that w.r.t.D i is gpȳq´gpyq. Hence, the contribution of t˚to the Hellinger distance is:
The last inequality follows by the convexity of p ? x´1q 2 and Jensen's inequality. The RHS is precisely the contribution by values with CDF in py,ȳs in the continuous case. Therefore, by applying this argument to all point masses, we reduce the problem to the continuous case.
Applications
Single-parameter Revenue Maximization. As we have discussed at the beginning of the section, strong monotonicity corresponds to strong revenue monotonicity in the context of singleparameter revenue maximization, which is shown by Devanur et al. [14] . In particular, for singleitem auction, it follows from Theorem 8 thatÕpnǫ´2q samples are sufficient for getting an ǫ-additive approximation when the bidders' valuations are bounded in r0, 1s, matching the optimal bound by Guo et al. [18] . The main difference compared with Guo et al. [18] lies in that we achieve the optimal upper bound using the empirical maximizer, which corresponds to Myerson's optimal auction w.r.t. the empirical distributions, while Guo et al. [18] needs to apply appropriate regularization to the empirical distribution and uses the corresponding regularized empirical Myerson's auction.
Theorem 10. In a single-item auction with n bidders whose values are bounded in r0, 1s, suppose the number of samples is at least: C¨n ǫ 2 logˆn ǫ˙l ogˆn ǫδḟ or some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the empirical Myerson's auction is an ǫ-additive approximation with probability at least 1´δ.
Prophet Inequality. In the context of prophet inequality, each hypothesis corresponds to a sequence of thresholds, one for each round, such that the algorithm accepts the first reward that is greater than or equal to the corresponding threshold. We show that this problem satisfies strong monotonicity; the proof is deferred to Appendix B.3.
Lemma 10. The problem of prophet inequality is strongly monotone.
As a corollary of Lemma 10, Theorem 8, and the fact that the optimal thresholds achieve at least one half of the expected max reward (e.g., Samuel-Cahn [29] ), 6 we get anÕ`nǫ´2˘sample complexity upper bound.
Theorem 11. For any instance of prophet inequality in which the rewards are bounded in r0, 1s, suppose the number of samples is at least: C¨n ǫ 2 logˆn ǫ˙l ogˆn ǫδḟ or some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the expected reward by the empirically optimal thresholds is an ǫ-additive approximation compared to the optimal thresholds and thus, is at least half of the expected max reward minus ǫ.
Prophet Inequality for i.i.d. Rewards. If the rewards are i.i.d., Correa et al. [11] prove an improved prophet inequality that achieves at least a 0.745 factor of the expected max reward. The strong monotonicity of prophet inequality for i.i.d. rewards follows as a special case of Lemma 10. Therefore, we get the sameÕ`nǫ´2˘sample complexity upper bound, matching the lower bound by Correa et al. [12] .
Theorem 12. For any instance of prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards bounded in r0, 1s, suppose the number of sample rewards (rather than reward vectors) is at least:
C¨n ǫ 2 logˆn ǫ˙l ogˆn ǫδḟ or some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, the expected reward by the empirically optimal thresholds is an ǫ-additive approximation compared to the optimal thresholds and thus, is at least a 0.745 factor of the expected max reward minus ǫ.
As mentioned in Section 1, the setting of Correa et al. [12] is different from ours in that they consider unbounded distributions and multiplicative approximation. Indeed, we focus on bounded-support distributions and additive approximation in the main text of the paper in order to develop a generalization theory that requires minimum knowledge of the structure of the problems. Nonetheless, Appendix B.4 demonstrates how to combine the techniques in this paper and the special structures of the prophet inequality with i.i.d. rewards to get the sameÕpnǫ´2q sample complexity upper bound in the setting of Correa et al. [12] , addressing an open problem therein. 7 Pandora's Problem. An algorithm for the Pandora's problem is a mapping from the history of observed rewards to either one of the unopened boxes, or the decision to stop and take the best observed reward. Since the former has exponentially many possibilities even after discretization, the naïve upper bound on the size of the hypothesis class is doubly exponential. Nonetheless, we show that the problem is strongly monotone, highlighting that strong monotonicity is a structural property without any obvious connection to the complexity/simplicity of the hypothesis class. The proof is deferred to Appendix C.3.
Lemma 11. Pandora's problem is strongly monotone.
Recall that in Section 2 we use the simple treatment of defining the value of a hypothesis to be the value of the corresponding algorithm plus n and then scaled by 1 n`1 to normalize its range to be r0, 1s. Therefore, to get an ǫ-additive approximation in Pandora's problem, we need a ǫ n`1 -additive approximation w.r.t. H. As a corollary of Lemma 11 and Theorem 8, we get anÕpn 3 ǫ´2q sample complexity bound. See Appendix C.4 for an analysis tailored for Pandora's problem to get the following optimal bound. Theorem 13. For any instance of Pandora's problem in which the rewards are bounded in r0, 1s, suppose the number of samples is at least:
or some sufficiently large constant C ą 0. Then, we can learn an ǫ-additive approximate algorithm from the samples. Further, to learn such an algorithm, the number of samples must be at least:
for some sufficiently small constant c ą 0.
Classification Problems: a Preliminary Discussion
In classification problems, there is a special data dimension which corresponds to the labels; the rest of the data dimensions correspond to the features. In particular, it is crucial that the labels are correlated with the features. Therefore, the assumption of independent data dimensions fail to hold. Nevertheless, below we present a straightforward extension of Theorem 1 under the assumption that the distribution of features conditioned on any given label is a product distribution. Although this preliminary result still relies on too strong an assumption to be useful in natural classification problems, we hope that it will serve as a stepping stone for follow-up works. See Section 6 for some related research directions. The rest of the section follows the notations in classification problems and denotes each data point as a feature-label pair px, yq, where x is the feature vector and y is the label. We assume that there are ℓ labels rℓs " t1, 2, . . . , ℓu. Let T " ś n i"1 T i denote an n-dimensional feature domain. Hence, the data domain under the model in Section 2 is Tˆrℓs. Let D Y denote the distribution of labels. Further, for any label y P rℓs, let D X|y denote a product distribution of features conditioned on having label y. For simplicity of notation, let D X denote the collection of conditional product feature distributions, and write D " D X˝DY be the joint distribution of feature-label pairs. By definition, the probability mass function of the joint distribution is:
We say that such a distribution has product conditional feature distributions.
Generalized Product Empirical Distribution. We now generalize the definition of product empirical distribution to classification problems that have product conditional feature distributions. Let the empirical distribution of labels E Y be the uniform distribution over sample labels. Further, for any label y P rℓs, let E X|y be the product empirical distribution w.r.t. the samples with label y. Concretely, for any i P rns, let the i-th coordinate of E X|y be a uniform distribution over the i-th coordinate of the samples with label y. As before, let E X denote the collection of product empirical feature distributions conditioned on the labels. Finally, let E " E X˝EY . By definition, the probability mass function of the joint distribution is:
Finally, we define the product empirical risk minimizer (PERM) to be the best hypothesis w.r.t. E. Here, note that we seek to minimize the objective. In particular, the PERM is an ǫ-additive approximation.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we rely on Lemma 1. It suffices to show that:
δpD, Eq ď ǫ .
To do so, we first decompose it into two parts, the error due to the estimation of the label distribution, and that due to the conditional feature distributions. By Eqn. (9) and Eqn. (10):
By Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, the squared Hellinger distance between the label distributions D y and E y is less than ǫ 2 8 . Further by the relation between the total variation and Hellinger distances, i.e., Lemma 2, we get that the first term on the RHS above is at most ǫ 2 . It remains to bound the second term, i.e., the error due to the estimation of the conditional feature distributions. Fix any label y P rℓs. By definition, the number of samples with label y is f E Y pyqN . Therefore, by Lemma 5 and the stated number of samples, the squared Hellinger distance between the feature distributions conditioned on y is at most:
Further by Lemma 2, their total variation distance is at most:
Hence, the second term is at most:
The second inequality follows by ř yPrℓs f E Y pyq " 1 and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Future Directions and Other Related Works
Sample Complexity of Simple Auctions/Hypotheses. A branch of the literature of sample complexity of auctions considers simpler auction formats such as the second-price auction with reserve prices. Readers are referred to Balcan et al. [3] , Cai and Daskalakis [8] , and Morgenstern and Roughgarden [22] for some examples. We restate that the theories developed in this paper are complementary to the existing ones; they are more suitable for problems with complex hypothesis classes (on product distributions). Hence, this paper does not try to apply the theories to these simpler families of auctions. That said, there are relatively few natural hypothesis classes whose "degrees-of-freedom" are smaller than the data dimensions. Hence, for strongly monotone problems, the sample complexity bound in Theorem 8 is competitive. Finally, we leave as a future question whether there are natural learning problems whose tight sample complexity bounds need both complexity measures of the hypotheses and the independence of data dimensions.
Beyond Product Distributions. Although arbitrarily correlated distributions seem intractable, it may be possible to generalize the theories in this paper to structured corrected distributions, which we leave as another future direction. Concretely, if we can learn from samples an appropriate representation of the data under which different dimensions are independent, we shall be able to combine it with the theories in this paper to get generalization bounds. To this end, the vast literature on principle component analysis (PCA) is related. See, e.g., Pearson [26] and Jolliffe [20] .
Classification Problems. Section 5 presents a preliminary result under a strong assumption that the feature distributions are independent conditioned on any given label. To further extend the theories in this paper to obtain useful generalization bounds for natural classification problems, we need to relax the assumption of having product conditional feature distributions, which is related to the last research direction. Moreover, although the algorithmic question of finding the optimal hypothesis w.r.t. a product distribution is well-studied for optimization problems in the Bayesian model, little is known about its counterpart for classification problems. In particular, it is unclear whether finding the best hypothesis w.r.t. the product empirical distribution is harder or easier than doing so w.r.t. the original notion of empirical distribution. On the one hand, the product empirical distribution is more structured; on the other hand, its support size is exponential in general, while the support size of the original empirical distribution is upper bounded by the number of samples.
Multi-parameter Auctions and Other Structural Properties. Multi-parameter revenue maximization is the only example in this paper that does not benefit from the improved sample complexity bound in Theorem 8 because it is not strong monotonicity. In fact, Hart and Reny [19] show that it is not even weakly monotone. Nonetheless, the hypotheses corresponding to multiparameter auctions are very different from those used in the proof of the lower bound (Theorem 2). We consider it an interesting open question if there is another structural property (unrelated to the complexity measures of the hypotheses) which applies to multi-parameter revenue maximization and, ideally, to a large family of problems, which lead to improved sample complexity bounds.
[ A Lower Bound for Finite-domain Problems: Proof of Theorem 2
For notation simplicity, we consider T " t0,˘1, . . . ,˘ku with support size 2k`1. We first define the hypothesis class H. Each hypothesis is specified by a binary nk-dimensional vector v P t˘1u nˆk . Specifically, H " th v u where h v : T n Ñ r0, 1s is defined as
Di P rns, j P rks, t "ˆ0, . . . , 0, v i,j¨j i'th , 0, . . . , 0˙ .
Next, we consider a family of distributions D " tD v u that are also indexed by v. For each dimension i of D v , the probability density function is defined as the following:
Our plan is to show that any algorithm that gets a ǫ-approximation on all distributions in D must take Ωp nk ǫ 2 q number of samples. When the underlying distribution is D v , the corresponding optimal hypothesis is h v . Intuitively, in order to achieve a good approximation to h v , an algorithm has to specify a vector v 1 close enough to v based on the samples. We formalize the intuition by calculating the loss of choosing h v 1 .
Lemma 12. For all v, v 1 , we have
where dpv, v 1 q is the hamming distance between v and v 1 .
Proof. For all v, v 1 , we have that
Next, we bound the lose of choosing h v 1 by the hamming distance between v and v 1 .
Let s be the samples and A be any (randomized) algorithm that takes samples s as inputs and outputs a vector Apsq P t˘1u nˆk . The next lemma states that if two distributions differ in only one dimension, then the total probability of A guessing wrongly for the two distributions is at least Ωp1q if the number of samples is Op nk ǫ 2 q. Lemma 13. For any Dv and D v where Dv and D v only differ in one dimension pi, jq, i.e., v i,j " 1, v i,j "´1, and for any algorithm A, when N " Op nk ǫ 2 q,
Proof. Since the n dimensions of the distribution are independent, to guess the pi, jq-th dimension of the underlying v, the only useful samples are those s with s i "˘j, which happens with probability 1 nk . Thus, when the number of samples is Op nk ǫ 2 q, with high probability, we have at most Op 1 ǫ 2 q number of useful samples. Note that these samples are either from
whose total variation distance is Θpǫq, then if we only have Op 1 ǫ 2 q samples, with constant probability we cannot distinguish distinguish whether the samples are from Dv or D v . In other words, for any algorithm A, Apsq i,j must be inconsistent with the underlying distribution with constant probability, which concludes the proof.
To finish the proof, we consider the performance of A on a uniform distribution over all distributions in D. Formally, let U be a uniform distribution on t˘1u nˆk , we have
Ωpnkq, (by Lemma 13) where dp¨,¨q denotes the hamming distance. By Lemma 12, this implies a Ωpǫq error of the output. Therefore, there exists a distribution D v that cannot be learned by A with Opǫq additive error.
B Missing Proofs about Prophet Inequality B.1 Optimal Hypothesis
An optimal strategy of prophet inequality when D has bounded support, denote as S D , is called backward induction, where we recursively compute the optimal reward for items appear behind i and set the thresholds θ i for item i. The algorithm for setting the strategy is as follows:
One particular note for this strategy is that the thresholds for the last n´i`1 dimension of D is independent of the arrivals there are before t i . Therefore, in further discussion we can abuse h ěi pDq to denote the expected reward of running the last n´i`1 dimension of an backward induction strategy S on D ěi " ś n j"i D j .
Algorithm 1 Optimal Strategy for Prophet Inequality in Bounded-support Case 1: θ n Ð 0 2: OptpD n q " E tn"Dn rt n s 3: for i from n´1 to 1 do 4:
OptpD ěi q " E t i ěθ i rt i s`Prrt i ă θ i sOptpD ěi`1 q 6: end for 7: // online strategy 8: i Ð 1 9: while i ď n do 10: if t i ě θ i then 11: Accept t i and stop 12: Let D ǫ{2 be the discretized version of D obtained from rounding the values of each marginal distribution D i down to the nearest multiples of ǫ. For all type t " D, define its downward discretization t ǫ{2 " t 2t ǫ u¨ǫ 2 , also, for the optimal strategy S D define a coupling optimal strategy S 1 D for t ǫ{2 " D ǫ{2 : First re-sample r "
then perform the original S D on t 1 " t ǫ{2`r and return the accepted item. We introduce the re-sample step because t 1 and t " D have the same distribution. Hence at any step i P rns, the probability that S 1 D accepts t ǫ{2 " D ǫ{2 equals to that of S D accepts t " D. We further show that the expected reward of the coupling optimal strategy is an ǫ-additive approximation of the original one:
Under the above definition, we have
Proof.
Now we go to the proof of Theorem 6. Let E ǫ{2 be the distribution obtained from rounding down the values of each dimension of E to the nearest supports of ǫ 2 . We want to show that, when N ě C¨n ǫ 3 logp n ǫδ q, h S E ǫ{2 will become the near-optimal hypothesis of D. Since E ǫ{2 is also the empirical distribution of D ǫ{2 , and has finite support with size 1 ǫ{2 in each dimension, a corollary of Theorem 1 shows that when N ě C¨n ǫ 3 logp n ǫδ q,
Then
It remains to show h S E ǫ{2 pD ǫ{2 q approximates h S E ǫ{2 pDq, i.e. the actual expected reward from the learned hypothesis. We elaborate it as follows:
Proof. Suppose E ǫ{2 is specified by thresholds θ " pθ 1 ,¨¨¨, θ n q. We can assume without loss of generality that each θ i is the multiple of ǫ 2 , since rounding the thresholds up does not affect the behavior of the strategy on E ǫ{2 . Therefore, for any type t and its downward discretization t ǫ{2 , S E ǫ{2 accepts t at the i th step if and only if S E ǫ{2 accepts t ǫ{2 at the i th step. This gives that
With this lemma in hand, we can complete the proof of Theorem 6.
B.3 Strong Monotonicity: Proof of Lemma 10
From now on, we abuse h ěi pDq to denote the expected revenue of running the last n´i`1 dimension of SD ěi on D ěi . We want to show by backward induction on i that @ product distributions D,D such that D ľD, the expected reward of performing SD on the last n´i`1 dimension of D is at least that of performing SD on the last n´i`1 dimension ofD, i.e. h ěi pD ěi q ě h ěi pD ěi q .
Base case: When i " n, there is only one item with value t n , and SD ěn accepts it with probability 1 and obtains the reward t n . Therefore, we have h ěn pDq " E Dn rt n s "
" ED n rt n s " h ěn pDq . Inductive step: Assume the induction hypothesis holds for all j ą i, i.e. @j ą i h ěj pDq ě h ěj pDq. Then since h ěi pDq satisfies the following recursion:
where the first term on the right-hand-side is the expected reward when the i th item is accepted, while the second one is the expected reward when the strategy accepts subsequent item. A similar recursion holds for h ěi pDq:
We then compare the first and the second term of h ěi pDq and h ěi pDq respectively.
where the first inequality comes from D i ľD i and the induction hypothesis. Furthermore, from the optimality of SD onD,we must have ED i rt i | t i ě θ i s ě h ěi`1 pDq , Otherwise SD could discard t i unconditionally and achieve higher expected revenue. Therefore,
B.4 Prophet Inequality with i.i.d. Unbounded Rewards
In [12] , an ǫ-approximately optimal strategy for known distribution in the unbounded support and i.i.d. case has been introduced. Denote the strategy for distribution D as R D . We restate the algorithm to generate R D is as follows:
Algorithm 2 Approximately Optimal Strategy for Unbounded Support Case 1: Solve differential equation y 1 " yplogpyq´1q´pβ´1q and yp0q " 1 where β « 1{0.745 2: for i from 1 to n do 3: ǫ i Ð 1´ypi{nq 1{pn´1q 4: end for 5: // online strategy 6: i Ð 1 7: while i ď n do 8: if ǫ i ă ǫ n then 9: if q D i pt i q ď ǫ i then 12:
Accept t i and stop 13: else 14: i Ð i`1 15: end if 16: end while In the following discussion, we will show a new sample complexity bound of achieving ǫmultiplicative approximation in the unbounded optimal stopping game.
Lemma 16. For arbitrary distribution D, the sample complexity required for Algorithm 2 is at mostÕp n ǫ 2 q.
The algorithm is to run the strategy R on a dominated empirical distributionẼ, which is defined below:
In Lemma 5 of Guo et al. [18] , it is shown that with high probability D ľẼ via a standard concentration bound. In the following discussion, denote the stopping time of running strategy R on input t as τ pR, tq Lemma 17. With high probability over samples for the algorithm, h R D pDq´h RẼ pDq ă P r t"D n rτ pRẼ, tq ă τ pR D , tqs¨OptpDq .
Proof. Since D ľẼ with high probability, @t P rns the value threshold in RẼ is lower than that of
Therefore, fix an input value configuration t, τ pRẼ, tq ď τ pR D , tq, and the only case where the revenue obtained from RẼ is smaller than that from R D should be τ pRẼ, tq ă τ pR D , tq.
Now it suffices to show that
Erh R D pDq´h RẼ pDq | τ pRẼ, tq ă τ pR D , tqs " OpOptpDqq .
For all t P rns, define A t as the set of input such that RẼ accepts at time t but R D does not accept: Then we can rewrite the above conditioned expected difference of revenue as follows:
Erh R D pDq | R D does not accept before ts ď OptpDq Lemma 18. When m ěÕpnǫ´2q, with high probability over samples for the algorithm, P r t"D n rτ pRẼ, tq ă τ pR D , tqs ă Opǫq .
ďP r t"D n rt P
the second inequality is also shown in Lemma 7 of Guo et al. [18] to be hold with high probability.
Recall from Algorithm 2 that ǫ t " 1´yp t n q 1{pn´1q . Now we bound (15) for yp t n q ă 1 n or yp t n q ą 1 n : Case 1: yp t n q ě 1 n . In this case,
Therefore when m ě nǫ´2 log n
Case 2: yp t n q ă 1 n . Since ypxq P r0, 1s when x P r0, 1s, we have @x P r0, 1s,
Therefore |tt P rn´1s, s.t. yp t n q ă 1 n u| ď 1 n¨1 0.3414¨n ď 3 , and when N ě nǫ´2 log n,
Combining the two cases, we have P r t"D n rτ pRẼ, tq ă τ pR D , tqs
C Missing Proofs about Pandora's Problem
C.1 Optimal Hypothesis
Optimal strategy of Pandora's problem An optimal strategy S D for D, introduced by [35] , opens the boxes sequentially according to its reservation value σ i , the threshold of the maximum realized values below which opening the i`1 th box will give rise to a higher expected reward. A formal definition of σ i is as follows:
we assume without loss of generality that the reserve value is non-increasing with the index of each box, i.e. σ 1 ě σ 2 ě σ n . Also, for convenience we use U i to denote the maximum value among the first i boxes:
and let U 0 def " 0. We restate the optimal strategy S D in [35] as Algorithm 3:
C.2 Discretization and Sample Complexity: Proof of Theorem 7
The proof of Theorem 7 is almost the same as that of Theorem 6. We include it here only for completeness.
Let D ǫ{2 be the discretized version of D obtained from rounding the values of each marginal distribution D i down to the nearest multiples of ǫ. Also, for all type t " D, let t ǫ{2 be its downward discretization to the multiples of ǫ 2 . For the optimal strategy S D define a coupling optimal strategy S 1 D for discretized type t ǫ {2: First re-sample r "
C.3 Strong Monotonicity: Proof of Lemma 11
It suffices to show that for any D ľD,
Since SD is the optimal strategy, h SD pD|U i " Hq is monotone in H, so it is only necessary to show the case when U i " H " σ i`1 . But in this case, simply choosing the largest among first i boxes would give a revenue of σ i`1´ř i j"1 c j , so
is true due to the optimality of the mechanism.
We will use backward induction from n to 0 to prove the following statement.
Lemma 22. For any 0 ď i ď n and any u 1
Proof. This holds trivially when i " n. In the following discussion, assume i ă n and the lemma holds for i`1.
If U i ď σ i`1 , the mechanism will choose to open the next box. In this case, because D i`1 ľD i`1 , it suffices to show that for any t i`1 ě t 1 i`1 , h SD pD|U i " u i , X i`1 " t i`1 q ě h SD pD|U i " u 1 i , X i`1 " t 1 i`1 q .
So it is enough to show that for any u i`1 ě u 1 i`1 , h SD pD|U i`1 " u i`1 q ě h SD pD|U i`1 " u 1 i`1 q .
We will consider three cases. In the first case, u i`1 ě u 1 i`1 ą σ i`2 . Then
In the second case, u i`1 ą σ i`2 ě u 1 i`1 , then we can apply Lemma 21 and have h SD pDq ď σ i`2´i`1 ÿ j"1 c i ă u i`1´i`1 ÿ j"1 c k " h SD pDq
In third case, σ i`2 ě u i`1 ě u 1 i`1 , the inequality follows directly from induction assumption.
C.4 Tight Bounds: Proof of Theorem 13
C.4.1 Upper Bound
We start by recalling the main obstacle for getting anÕ`n ǫ 2˘s ample complexity upper bound as a direct corollary of Theorem 8. In Pandora's problem, an algorithm may pay a cost up to 1 to open each box and thus, the range of the realized objective is r´n, 1s instead of r0, 1s. In the main text, we use a simple hypothesis class H, which has a hypothesis h A for each algorithm A, normalizing its value to be in r0, 1s by letting it be the realized objective of A plus n and scaled by 1 n`1 . Therefore, to get an ǫ-additive approximation in Pandora's problem, we need a ǫ n`1 -additive approximation w.r.t. the general learning problem H. Therefore, applying Theorem 8 to this hypothesis class H gives only anÕ`n 3 ǫ 2˘s ample complexity bound. Although the objective could be as small as´n in the worst cases, intuitively the chance of getting such a bad objective shall be negligible if the algorithm is reasonable w.r.t. the underlying distribution. Indeed, we will reason that it is without loss of generality to consider algorithms that stop whenever the cost exceeds log 1 ǫ . As a result, we avoid scaling the value of the hypotheses by a n`1 factor.
In particular, we consider the following notion of rational algorithms w.r.t. a given distribution.
Definition 4 (Rational Algorithms). For any distribution D and any cost vector c, an algorithm A for the Pandora's problem is rational w.r.t. D and c if whenever A opens a box i, the expected increase in the best observed reward is greater than or equal to the cost c i .
The next lemma follows by the definition of the optimal algorithm. Lemma 23. Suppose A is the optimal algorithm w.r.t. a distributionD and a cost vector c. Then, A is rational w.r.t. any distribution D that stochastically dominates (includingD itself ), and c.
Lemma 24. Suppose an algorithm A is rational w.r.t. a distribution D and a cost vector c. Then, the probability that A pays a cost more than Ω`log 1 ǫ˘i s at most ǫ. Proof. For 1 ď i ď n, let X i be objective after round i; if the algorithm stops before round i, let X i " X i´1 . Let X 0 " 0. Then, by that A is rational, we have:
That is, X i 's form a discrete-time submartingale. We have´1 ď X i´Xi´1 ď 1 by definition. Further, for any round 1 ď i ď n, X i´Xi´1 is upper bounded by the increment in the best observed reward in the round. Therefore, ř i:X i ěX i´1 pX iX i´1 q is at most the best observed reward at the end, which is upper bounded by 1. Hence, we have:
( ř i:X i ěX i´1 pX i´Xi´1 q ď 1) Since the cost is at most´X n by definition, it suffices to upper bound the probability that X n ď´Ω`log 1 ǫ˘. Then, the lemma follows by Bernstein's inequality for submartingales.
In the following arguments, consider a hypothesis class H, which has a hypothesis for any algorithm A such that its value equals the objective of A, without scaling. Further, fixed the cost vector c, let h D be the hypothesis that corresponds to the optimal algorithm for D and c. Finally, leth D be the hypothesis that corresponds to a truncated version of the optimal algorithm for D, which stops whenever the cost exceeds Ω`log 1 ǫ˘.
Lemma 25. Fixed any cost vector c. For any D ľD, the truncated version of optimal algorithm w.r.t.D gets an expected value greater than or equal to that of the untruncated version minus ǫ:
hD`D˘ě hD`D˘´ǫ .
Proof. By Lemma 23, hD is rational w.r.t. D and c. Hence, by Lemma 24, the probability that the truncated versionhD and the original version hD give different outcomes is at most ǫ. Finally, whenever they are different, hD gets at most 1 extra reward in subsequent rounds. Putting together proves the lemma. Therefore, we have:
Opt`D˘´h`D˘ě ǫ nˆ1´1`ǫ n˙n`´k`ˆkÿ i"1ˆ1´1`ǫ n˙i´1`kÿ i"1ˆ1´1´ǫ n˙i´1ě ǫ nˆkÿ i"1ˆ1´1`ǫ n˙n`kÿ i"1ˆ1´1`ǫ n˙n" ǫk nˆ1´1`ǫ n˙n ě ǫk n exp`´2´2ǫ˘.
The last inequality is due to 1´x ą e´2 x for 0 ă x ă 1 2 .
Lemma 28. For any algorithm A, any box 1 ď i ď n, and any two neighboring instances D`and D´that differ only in the i-th coordinate, we have:
Pr "
A makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. D`‰`Pr " A makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. D´‰ ě Ωp1q .
Proof. By definition, any hypothesis h makes a mistake on box i w.r.t. either D`or D´. Let Hà nd H´denote the two subsets of hypotheses respectively. On the one hand, we have:
Pr " A picks h P H`given samples from D`‰`Pr " A picks h P H´given samples from D`‰ " 1 .
On the other hand, with less than c¨n ǫ 2 samples for some sufficiently constant c ą 0, and by Lemma 26, we have:
Pr "
A picks h P H´given samples from D`‰ ě Pr " A picks h P H´given samples from D´‰´Op1q , for a sufficiently small constant inside the big-O notation. Putting together proves the lemma.
As a direct corollary, we have the following via a simple counting argument.
Lemma 29. There is an instance D for which the algorithm makes Ωpnq mistakes in expectation.
Proof. By Lemma 28, if D is chosen from the 2 n possible instances uniformly at random, the algorithm makes a mistake on each box i with constant probability. So the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 13 (Lower Bound). Consider the instance in Lemma 29. Suppose the algorithm makes αn mistakes in expectation where α ą 0 is a constant. Then, by a standard probability argument, the probability that it makes at least αn 2 mistakes is at least 1 2 . Hence, by Lemma 27, the expected additive error is at least Ωpǫq.
